BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 10-5

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Operations

ICBM STANDARDIZATION, EVALUATION,
AND TRAINING GUIDELINES

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

This document establishes the standardized guidelines for administering training and evaluation scenarios in the Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT). It replaces all previous guidance and clarification messages that covered MPT administration and scenario presentation. This publication applies to all Twentieth Air Force and subordinate units. Maintain and dispose of records created as a result of prescribed processes in accordance with AFMAN 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule* (will become AFMAN 33-322, Volume 4). Comply with AFI 33-332/AFSPC Sup 1, *Privacy Act,* for documents containing privacy act information. For official use only information, comply with DoDR 5400.7, *DoD Freedom of Information Act Program,* Air Force Supplement/AFSPC Sup 1, Chapter 4.

1. General Procedures.

1.1. Outside Agency Responses. Outside agencies are only knowledgeable to the extent of the technical orders and regulations they possess. In the sterile environment of the MPT, where the intent is to assess the MCC's knowledge, outside agencies will not challenge, correct, or otherwise prompt the MCC, unless the agency's technical data would direct them to do so.

1.1.1. When an MCC makes phone calls to other LCCs or outside agencies, the response should always be commensurate with the MCC's input. For example, if an MCC passes a launch report via HVC, other LCCs should respond with their appropriate report. If an MCC passes incomplete or incorrect information to an outside agency, the agency should reply with understanding of the status and not correct or challenge the MCC's information. Agencies will provide guidance consistent with MCC inputs and applicable technical data. Reference 20 AF/DOME guidance for determining relay scenarios.

1.2. Missile Procedures Trainer Operator (MPTO). The MPTO will function as a neutral party and will not challenge, prompt, or confirm actions the MCC directs. The MPTO may be anyone who has been trained on MPT operations and possesses the appropriate clearance to view the MPT script. An MPTO is not required to be a certified instructor/evaluator or even a certified MCCM. However, units

are encouraged to use OGV personnel as MPTOs during evaluations. Additionally, MPTOs will not determine ratings, errors, or otherwise officially contribute to an MCC's documented performance in the MPT. This does not preclude MPTOs from contributing to fact-finding sessions or discussing MCC actions during error determination.

1.3. Hardening Systems. For the purpose of evaluations, only evaluate blast doors, ESOVs, and blast valves when hardening is directed. If the MCC notes the requirement to harden the phones, overhead bay areas, access doors (e.g., power panel doors), and so forth, brief accomplished.

2. Status Presentation.

2.1. Level A TEPS. Start timing upon completion of all status presentation. Stop timing when MCC successfully completes the task, the time expires, or the MCC has demonstrated they will not accomplish the task.

  2.1.1. Do not introduce new unrelated level A or B status until the MCC successfully completes the task , the time expires, or the MCC clearly indicates they are not going to perform the task.

  2.1.2. If the MCC incorrectly accomplishes the task, they have the balance of the level A TEPS to recover to a lesser severity of error.

2.2. Status Presentation. Proper status presentation is critical to accurately assessing an MCC's proficiency in the MPT. Use the following guidelines when conducting unit training and evaluation scenarios:

  2.2.1. Outside agencies will not challenge, correct, or prompt the MCC during training/evaluation.

    2.2.1.1. If the MCC takes an action which affects equipment or agencies outside their LCC, other LCCs will mirror that action. For example, if an MCC sends an ELC when not required, all other LCCs will send an ELC as well. This does not apply to actions taken within the LCC, such as fire isolation, APQ management, and so forth.

    2.2.1.2. If the MCC requests status from another LCC, that LCC must provide correct status. For example, if LF02 is LFDN, but during fault processing the MCC asks other LCCs if they see LF03 LFDN, the response should be "No."

    2.2.1.3. Determining relay on messages is considered a request for status and should be presented in accordance with paragraph **2.2.1.2.**

  2.2.2. Do not rely on the MPT to provide proper indications in every scenario. Every effort should be made to provide all squadron configuration and commit actions; however, care must be taken to avoid interfering with MCC actions. If slow MCC processing or script development prevents presentation of all configuration actions prior to keyturn, present only the needed configuration actions and squadron ELC to provide positive launch indications. Do not present any squadron configuration actions until the MCC has successfully initiated their own configuration actions. [REACT] Since a PLCA will lock the MPT for 10 seconds, do not present blocks containing a PLCA within 15 seconds of an ICT.> In instances where an MCC immediately keyturns after accomplishing configuration actions and the MPT does not provide proper indications, brief proper indications and present the appropriate blocks to provide positive launch indications. Any configuration blocks not presented prior to keyturn need not be presented after keyturn unless they are necessary to provide proper launch indications.

2.3. Problem cards. Clearly state "I have a problem card for the crew," and hand the card to either MCCM.

2.3.1. If a level A TEPS applies, start the time when the MCC accepts the card.

2.4. Fire Presentation. Use problem cards to introduce status that cannot be automatically presented by the MPT. The card should state that the MCC notes smoke either coming from a certain area or coming from the equipment identified by the evaluator. The evaluator must ensure the MCC is observing and outline the affected piece of equipment twice. Start the level A TEPS upon completion of the status presentation. The evaluator must ensure there is no confusion on the location of the smoke/contaminants. When an MCCM is close to the affected equipment, the evaluator should brief the MCCM senses heat.

2.4.1. During evaluations, limit REACT console fires to a single VDU or the entire console. For VDU fires, present two problem cards; one for erratic indications on the affected VDU and one for smoke from the base of the console.

2.4.2. MCC inaction during fires. In the event the MCC does not respond to the presented fire, or takes incorrect isolation actions, do not present additional status, such as "Smoke is becoming thicker," "Personal safety is now in jeopardy," or "You note additional smoke coming from …." Original indications will remain present and unchanged.

2.4.2.1. If an overheat condition is detected on the VDU, it is possible that Dimethylformamide (DMF) venting may occur. If this condition occurs in the field, the judgment to evacuate or to contain the overheat condition will be made by the MCC. If venting is presented in the MPT, the MCC should be informed that they detect an ammonia smell and presented a briefing/problem card that states whether or not time permits to accomplish steps [1,3,5] 5-10 of the LCC Electrical Fire and Overheat procedure.

2.5. NUDET Presentation. Proper presentation of NUDETS will include the following:

2.5.1. SACDIN Status. If the MCC under evaluation is a PLCC crew, present Comm 1 and 2 lights on the SFU and line down indications only if the MBCP site (SCP) or feed-through PLCC site is taken down or destroyed IAW the evaluation. Consider the following scenarios: The evaluation is at C01 LCC in the 319 MS and the evaluatee MCC is a PLCC. IAW TO 21M-LGM30F-1-23, Figures 1-2 (Wing 5), Comm 1 and 2 lights will only be present at C01 if A01 LCC (MBCP/SCP) or D01 (feed-through LCC) are down/destroyed. The appropriate line down indications for either A01 or D01 will also be present. If the evaluation is at A01, no indications should be given regardless of the qualifications of the evaluatee MCC since the proper SACDIN equipment for A01 is not present in the MPT. Initial inbriefs for MPT evaluations must include the fact that the MPT is configured as a HUTE, even for SCP crews.

2.5.2. LCC Status. Comply with METER instructions. Status indications for destroyed LCCs should include [1,3,5]SLT VC # [1X] MSR 605/625 # (where # is the timeslot of the destroyed LCC), LCC DOWN indications, and no contact via HVC. These are scenario dependent. Dial lines and EWO 1 will be down. HVC and EWO 2 will remain up as long as you have interconnectivity within the squadron or squadrons; however, both HVC and EWO 2 may be presented as impaired/inoperative within the constraints listed in METER. [1X,3,5]EB blast valves should close then reopen after the overpressure is no longer detected and 20 minutes have elapsed. ISST/UHF/VHF will depend upon the status presented. They can either be presented as down or up; if

they are down, the MCC must be informed of this status. MIIDS will either be in access or alarmed, depending on whether topside personnel were evacuated to the EB.

2.5.3. LF Status. Comply with METER instructions. LF indications are dependent on missile launch and status monitoring capability. NUDET indications for a LF that has launched are: [1,3,5]CES, MSLA, LIP, DCBSY, LFNG, IPDDS, OZ, IZ, POWFL, LFALM, and GMR 2, 5, 10, 26, 27, 28, 29 [1X] 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 367, 372, 377, 380, 381, MSLA, CES. NUDET indications for a LF that has not launched are: [1,3,5] EN, PGLV, IPDDS, RAMO, OZ, IZ, POWFL, LFALM, and GMR 2, 5, 26, 27, 28, 29 [1X] 301, 302, 308, 324, 328, 330, 529, 567, 569, 573. LFs may also be presented as LFDN. The decision to have the sortie come up on the diesel depends upon what type of scenario is being simulated (support building destroyed or not) and may be presented either way.

2.5.3.1. Destroyed LF Status. Destroyed LFs should be shown as LFDN. MSLA indications may or may not be present.

2.6. MPT malfunctions. As a general rule, MPT malfunctions warrant a suspension of the evaluation and backout of the MCC. However, sound professional judgment should be exercised at all times by evaluators in this regard. For example, during the last script event, the WSCE VDU freezes up on one side after the MCC has received and seen all of the indications (i.e., LFOS at LF02). The only actions remaining are a launch report and call to MMOC. In this case, it is acceptable to brief "Disregard the frozen WSCE VDU screen" and allow the crew to finish the last two items. This is acceptable if the status can be corrected or briefed and the crew has every available opportunity to react to the status and complete all actions. If not, the crew must be backed out and the malfunction corrected.

2.6.1. Known EACU Problems. The EACU for Wings 3/5 MPT does not work correctly. Currently, the palm pushbutton pops out during an LOPP and the alarm sounds even though the EACU is programmed to fail. During an LOPP, the palm pushbutton should not pop out and the alarm should not sound since there is no power to the Air Flow Alarm Monitor Panel. When the MCC reaches the appropriate step of EPAP, evaluators should attempt to position the palm pushbutton to in, extinguish the alarm, brief the correct status, (i.e., "Disregard my actions. Please assume the palm pushbutton did not extend and the low air flow alarm did not sound.") and allow the MCC to interact with the equipment. Although there is a level A TEPS running, evaluators will provide correct status and adjust level A timing as necessary until the MPT malfunction is corrected.

2.7. Script Programming. Scripts should be programmed to provide correct status to the MCC to the maximum extent possible. If the MPT is capable of providing status through programming, this capability must be used. In cases where proper status cannot be programmed, evaluators should be prepared to provide written (problem cards) or verbal status. Include relevant briefings in the script.

2.7.1. Build scripts such that commands are available for each action an MCC may direct. For example, if the script allows the SCP to direct actions in any configuration they choose, blocks must be built and available to cover all possible scenarios. An alternative to this situation is to have the script direct the SCP to accomplish specific actions, i.e., "For the purpose of the evaluation, please accomplish the PLCB, Echo will accomplish the enable." This method is preferred when the directed actions are required JPRs. Unless the consequences of incorrect preparatory delegation is being evaluated, scripts should always require the MCC to accomplish at least one of the required preparatory commands.

2.7.2. [REACT] Units will not include more than one PLCA command per block when scripting pre-launch actions. For nominal squadron configurations, there should be four pre-launch blocks that include the appropriate PLCA and enable (one per LCC).

2.7.3. [REACT]Units will not use the M2 command for clock advances. Build clock advance blocks with the following commands: M41, M##.

3. Error Determination.

3.1. Error assessment. Assess errors IAW AFSPCI 36-2202, AFSPCI 36-2202, 20 AF Supplement 1, and METER.

3.2. Incorrect Actions. If an MCC takes an incorrect action, document the appropriate error. In some cases, the error may be recoverable to a lesser severity of error. Use the following guidance when applying this concept:

3.2.1. Actions by the MCC that result in the transfer of timeslot when not required; unnecessary shutdown of an operational console/LCC; removal of the ability to command PLC, ENC, or ELC; generate target constants or execution plans; or perform RDC; are critical errors that are, as a general rule, not recoverable. However, momentary glitches due to status monitoring, inadvertent actions, or miscalculations that are <u>immediately</u> corrected <u>may be</u> recoverable to a lesser severity of error. When applying this concept the actions of the MCC must be readily apparent to the evaluators and no doubt must exist as to the intent of their actions.

3.2.2. Recovery from a minor error to no error is possible if the MCC does not take actions that impact entities outside their LCC. For example, an incorrect report to an outside entity can be corrected to no error <u>before concluding the call</u>. A second report correcting the information will reduce the level of error, but the error will not be eliminated. If the MCC transmits an incorrect command, incorrectly accomplishes an internal command/test, or trips an incorrect circuit breaker, the error is consummated immediately upon the action taken and complete recovery is not possible. Minor proficiency errors can be written for any task accomplished correctly but not in the manner it was trained, to include performances not IAW local unit procedures and techniques.

3.2.3. If the MCC directs an incorrect action over phone lines, assess the appropriate level of error upon termination of the phone call. An error is consummated upon termination of an incorrect phone call, regardless of the time remaining in the level A TEPS. The error may be recovered to a lesser severity if the MCC calls back within the level A TEPS, but it may not be removed completely.

3.2.4. Units must be careful in setting artificial limits. For example, if an MCCM's eyeglasses cross the plane of the MPP, no error should be awarded although a caution appears to have been violated. Evaluator judgment always applies. A complete understanding of the MPP is necessary for the crew and the evaluators. The danger with the MPP is electrocution through contact with exposed circuits. Failure to remove a metal ring or using a pen (with a metal clip) are examples of failing to use extreme caution.

3.3. Scripted Actions. Assess errors regardless of the scripted task outcome. For example, if a crew shuts down the LCC when not required due to an early reset of the EFOR, a critical error should be assessed even if the EFOR was scripted to be unresettable and LCC shutdown would have been required. The important distinction is that at the time the crew made the decision to shut down, it was not required. The same logic applies in EWO scenarios.

3.3.1. When the MCC takes actions which deviate from the script, every effort must be made to provide correct status. For example, if an MCC directs a sortie be manually safed when not required, the following status should be presented. At the next clock advance, a team should arrive at the affected LF. A complete LF activities briefing must be presented. MEEDS operations, dispatches, and combinations may be briefed accomplished. The arriving team should state they are on site to safe the sortie. If asked, they will perform no maintenance or are unable to fix the condition. Once the MCC has directed the team to continue with its actions, a clock advance can be offered. If accepted, a critical error is warranted. If at any time during the LF Activities briefing, up to accepting the clock advance, the crew cancels the team, they can recover to a minor error.

3.4. Clock advances. Present scripted clock advances IAW the script.

3.4.1. Do not brief crews into errors during clock advances. For example, following SIOP execution, but prior to NUDETs, a sortie in the crew's primary flight goes LFDN. The crew correctly accomplished faults and security, but fails to request guarding. At the subsequent clock advance, the script calls for the security situation to be terminated. A major error appears to be warranted for failure to have the site guarded. Although the requirement for LF guarding still exists after SIOP execution, in this scenario the crew must be given every opportunity to recover. If, at the clock advance, the security situation has been terminated, the ART must remain on site until released by the crew. The crew cannot be briefed into an error via a clock advance.

3.4.2. Clock advances are not considered to be "mini check phase terminations." There is only one "check-phase termination" per check phase. Clock advances may impact error determination, depending on how the clock advance status affects the crew's ability to recover from errors committed prior to the clock advance. For example, if the crew fails to accomplish a required action (level B task) prior to the clock advance, but is able to accomplish the task after the clock advance, the error may be partially or fully recovered depending on the circumstances. However, if the clock advance status removes the crews ability to accomplish the required action (e.g., reconfigures equipment, removes sortie status, etc.), award the appropriate error for failure to accomplish the task.

3.5. Do not allow MCCs to perform in an unrealistic manner in order to "game" the system. For example, reference AFSPCI 36-2203, 1 Jul 97; T.O. 21M-LGM30G-1-22. Due to the requirements of AFSPCI36-2203, JPR E03B, performances 2.1 and 3, MCCs routinely read the LCEB Fire and Overheat Procedure's warnings in a rapid and unintelligible fashion. This unrealistic reading of technical data warnings to a facility manager and chef would be generally ineffective in an operational environment. If crews under evaluation are briefing the warnings, notes, and cautions in an unintelligible manner, they are not meeting the intent of the aforementioned performances for JPR E03B and the TEPS for LCEB Fires. If this is the case, assess the appropriate error for violating TEPS. It should be stressed to crew members that scenarios and interaction with support personnel in the MPT are not to be "gamed" in order to meet a TEPS. The MPT is designed to mirror the actual environment of the LCC as much as possible, and crew actions in the MPT should be as near to real world performance as possible (i.e., in an actual fire the crew would adamantly ensure a team was aware of all warnings and cautions to prevent injury or loss of life).

3.6. Sound Professional Judgment. Evaluator judgment always applies. For example, an MCC enters Inhibit Anti jam for an all call enable. One of the flight sorties fails the inhibit. Subsequently, the crew initiates another eight inhibits for that affected sortie. The sortie fails the inhibits again. At step 17 of the I/AJ checklist (IPD) the crew commands the IPDC command all-call. Technically, a minor error

could be awarded to the crew for sending the IPDC to an enabled sortie thus violating command validity. However, in the above scenario, a minor error would only be awarded if the sortie was selectively enabled. This is a unique circumstance. Although the crew technically violated command validity, they took the most expeditious route in enabling IPD data at the other sorties and finishing a section four checklist. No error is warranted.

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